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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the modality contained in declarative sentences is heterogeneous by nature, and
its indiscernible treatment evoked pardoxical behaviors of individuals in modal contexts. The difficulty is
avoided by classifying the modality in two kinds from a normative point of view: 1) modality in a traditinal
sense, which is a freedom under a certain convention, and 2) multi-modality which stems from the difference
of conventions. The former is treated in the traditional modal logic, but the latter kind of modality which
typically appears in belief sentences is captured in another framework called multi-model. This solution
deeply concerns the ontology of individuals, therefore the existential presupposition of individuals, too. So,
I further propose its treatment by means of a kind of three-valued semantics.
1 Introduction
The modality of natural languages has always been one of the main objects of formal semantics. Because
declarative sentences of natural languages are analyzed as a predication to individuals, and normally appear
with modality, behaviors of individuals in modal contexts inevitably come into question.
In fact, the effort to clarify them has been continuing hundred years since Frege[8, 9]. And in the modal
logic, researchers succeeded in it to a certain extent, proposed some possible solutions to the problems in
the philosophy and ordinary languages. However, such a method is not almighty, suffers from difficulties,
e.g. in the interpretation of belief sentences.
The reason for the difficulty lies in treating heterogeneous modal phenomena in a homogeneous manner.
Therefore, it's necessary to analyze the concept of modality into its parts.
They consist of the modality in the narrow sense covered by the traditional modal logic and the modality
found in belief sentences. The former is the freedom under the same ontological convention of language,
the latter is the freedom under several different conventions. They are called (mere) -modality' and 'multi-
modality' respectively. The former can be treated by the traditional modal logic or the possible world
semantics, but for the treatment of the latter, I introduce the method called 'multi-model'.
2 Origin of Modality
The introduction of possible worlds is motivated by the intuition: "This and this could have been otherwise".
E.g., suppose that the following sentence
(1) Yamada is a student of Hiroshima City University.
is actually true. But Yamada could be a student of the Kyushu University under another circumstance.
Or the prime minister of Japan (at the time point July 1995) could be Ozawa, although he's actually
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Murayama. Such intuitions can be explained by assuming possible worlds where the set of students of
Hiroshima City University or the prime minister of Japan are different from the actual ones.
The substitutibility of two terms which actually designate the same thing, and the existential general-
ization are used to determine if the context is intensional. 1
 E.g., from
(2) It is necessary that 9 is greater than 7 [18]
and
(3) the number of planets = 7.
(4) It is necessary that the number of planets is greater than 7
cannot be inferred.
Likewise. from
(5) There is no such thing as Pegasus (Ibid.),
(6) There is something which there is no such thing as
cannot be inferred.
From the viewpoint of the possible world semantics, (2)-(4) can be explained by assuming the situation
where the number of planets is not 9, and (5), (6) by the fact that 'Pegasus' doesn't designate anything,
although it has a designation in the myth.
3 Modality in Belief Sentences
But the semantic behavior of individuals in the context of belief sentences evoked much annoyance among
semanticists.
E.g.. if Bill mistakes Mary for Anna, then
(7) --.(Mary = Anna)
and
(8) Bill believes that Mary is (called) Anna
are both true. But according to the Kripkian thesis that the definite description determines the dictum,
and the proper name the res, such a mistake cannot happen. (Cf. [14].)
Further, suppose that Tom believes that the orator Cicero and Tully, the author of De Senectute, are
different, although they are actually the same. Then, both
(9) Tom believes that Cicero donounced Catiline,
and
(10) Toni believes that Tully didn't denounce Catiline
can be true[17, §44.]. But insofar as the above thesis is correct, and Toni is rational. (9) and (10) cannot
he true at the same time.
In this case, there is another problem. 'Cicero' and 'Tully' denote the same individual, i.e. one and the
same unseparable thing. Nevertheless, it seems to split up to two individuals in Tom's belief.
On the other hand, two individuals can merge together to one individual. E.g., if Bill thinks that Mary
and Anna are the same person called Anna, and says that
(11) Anna is a high schooler,
the entity whose existence Bill believes is something like a chimera of Mary and Anna. But according to
the Kripkian thesis, this cannot be the case either.2
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4 Normative View of Modality
To sum up, the above problems are formulated as follows:
(12) I) As to individuals:
a) Does the individual domain change w.r.t. possible worlds or not? (5,6)
b) Do individuals split up and merge together w.r.t. possible worlds or not? (9)-(11)
II) As to the relation between expressions and their denotations:
a) Do denotations of definite descriptions change w.r.t. possible worlds or not? (2)-(4)
b) Do the denotations of the proper names change w.r.t. possible worlds or not? (7, 8)
But in a sense, the answers to them are clear from the beginning. As above, the individual domain actually
changes, individuals split up and merge together, and denotations of definite descriptions and proper names
change. The problem concerns if the phenomena should be seen w.r.t. possible worlds".
Formally, all the above examples seem to be treated within the possible world semantic framework.
E.g., as to (7) and (8), in the possible world which represents Bill's epistemic state, the individual Mary is
designated by the proper name -Anna'. And as to (9) and (10), the individual Cicero in the actual world
has two counterparts which are designated by the proper names 'Cicero' and 'Tully' in the possible world
which represents Tom's epistemic state.
But there is the following difficulty with this method.
(13) Indexicals:
O'Leary: "Are you going to the party?".
Miller: "Yes, I'm going". [22, p.278]
(14) Proper names: in the situation of (8):
Bill: "Is Anna going to the party?".
Observer: "Yea, she is going". (In reality: Not Anna but Mary is goint to the party.)
(15) Definite descriptions:
Bill: "The man who is drinking martini is a movie director".
Observer: "Ah so". 	 (In reality: He isn't drinking martini but water.) [5, p.86]
Intuitively, in (13), O'Leary and Miller talk about the same propositional content. But if we assume that
the denotations of T and -you' are determined w.r.t. possible worlds (including contexts), their mutual
propositional content cannot be the intension in this sense. Likewise in (14) and (15), in order for the
observer to share the propositional content with Bill, he must have the following belief in secret:
(14') Mary is going.
(15') The man who is drinking water is a movie director.
But their intensions cannot be the same as those of Bill's assertions.
But the main reason for the difficulty is found in the ontological, metaphysical view concerning the
possible worlds.
For this, let's see the following examples. Today, lm is defined as the length of standard meter in Paris.
And suppose that, actually, there is a boy called Bill. Then, insofar as the modality in
(16) lm would have been the height of Napoleon,
(17) Bill would have been called David
is interpreted in a possible world semantic manner, it deviates from the traditional interpretation of proper
names where they are rigid designators, because the denotations of the proper names in (16) and (17) lm
and Bill - change w.r.t. possible worlds. But this suggests that the modaility in (16) and (17) is different
from the traditional possible world semantic modality. The difference between them is the following: the
former concerns the freedom in determining the denotation, the latter the freedom after it. Normally. the
determination of the denotations of proper names is empirical and contingent. lm is defined using the
physical, contingent attribute, 1/40000 of the circumference of the earth. So is the dubbing of Bill. But
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once their denotation are determined. they necessarily designate the same thing among all possible worlds.
I.e., they are rigid designators, because they are defined so. In other words, the necessity in the traditional
possible world semantics is a normative necessity, and the contingency is the freedom in this normative
framework.
The necessity is often contrasted with a prioricity and analyticity. The former is antonymous to a
pösterioricity, the latter to syntheticity. A prioricity means -before the experience", i.e. something gained
without experience, and set, number. logical laws etc. are examples for it. Analyticity means that something
implicitely contained in a concept is inferred by analyzing it.
(18) Every bachelor is unmarried
is an example of analytic statements. In (18), the attribute 'unmarried' is contained in 'bachelor' from the
beginning.
As to the relation between them. there are tough philosophical discussions, which normally think of
them as different concepts. But I think that both a prioricity and analyticity are certain kinds of normative
laws. So, insofar as the necessity is understood as a normative necessity, they should also be included to
the category of necessity.
Each epistemic subject determines the norm, or precisely. the epistemic subject under a particular
situation. because the same proper name 'Bill' can be used to denote another person in another situation.
As it's clear from (13), the necessity with indexicals
	 `now', 'you' as in
(19) I'm here now
is different from possible world semantic necessity. because we can say
(20) I might not be here now. [12, p,71]
This kind of necessity concerns the determination of a denotation. As in (16) and (17), the determination
of a denotaion is normally contingent. But there are some expressions accompanied with linguistic rules
determining them. And indexicals are examples for them. Kaplan calls such a regularity 'validity' in
contrast with the necessity in the traditional sense[12, 13]. Further, he calls the latter kind of modality
`content'. the former 'character'.
There are also 'extensional' expressions which designate the same thing independent of their circum-
stances - in the sense of content as well as character. They are found among others in scientific termi-
nology. They are a common asset in a linguistic community. Therefore. also philosophers of language
started from extensional expressions, and even when the modality of natural language came into question,
they implicitely assumed a common concept concerning the denotaions of linguistic expressions, and failed
to deeply recognize their relativity to epistemic subjects, from which the Russell's assertion results that
indexicals are not necessary to scientific purpose [19, 20].
But as to natural languages, the elasticity of determining the denotation of an expression depending
on contexts should be positively interpreted as efficiency of language (s. [3, 2].). We can easily understand
that, if the partner of a conversation uses 'I', it doesn't mean me but herself, we can denote another person
with the same proper name in another situation, and enjoy a myth or a science fiction assuming Pegasus
or the Knight of Jedi which do not actually exist.
To determine a norm concerning denotation is to determine a model of interpreting a language, and it
differs according to epistemic subjects in particular situations. In this sense, the framework of interpretation
is a so-called 'point language', and the possible world semantic modality appears inside it. In contrast, the
modality in choosing a point language, i.e. a model, is a multi-model semantic modality. In this paper, we
call the traditional possible world semantic modality the (mere) modality, and the multi-model semantic
modality the multi-modality.3
Now, the answer to (12) looks like as follows:
(21) I) As to individuals:
a) The individual domain is constant w.r.t. possible worlds.
13) Individuals don't split up nor merge together.
II) As to the relation between expressions and their denotations:
a) Denotations of definite descriptions change w.r.t. possible worlds.
1)) Denotations of proper names are constant w.r.t. possible worlds.
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In contrast, the answer with 'models' instead of 'possible worlds' is formulated as follows:
(22) I) As to individuals:
a) The individual domain changes w.r.t models.
b) Individuals split up and merge together w.r.t. models.
II) As to relation between expressions and their denotations:
a) Denotations of definite descriptions change w.r.t. models.
b) Denotations of proper names change w.r.t. models.
(21) covers the modality, and (22) the multi-modality. But it should be noticed that. according to the
above formulation, less phenomena than before can be treated by the possible world semantic method, and
those problems which cause much trouble to it are interpreted in the multi-modality. E.g.. Pegasus in (5)
and (6) is normally treated in the traditional modality. but insofar as the epistemic subject doesn't commit
itself to its existence, it should be treated in a multi-modal manner.
Further, (21) and (22) imply the following consequence about the ontology of individuals.
First, (21Ia) justifies the following meaning postulate in [16]:
(23) arO('x = John)
But it means that, assuming that John was born 1920 and died 1990, there exists the same individual
John not only in his lifetime but also 1900 or 2000. There are some researchers (such as Carlson[4]) who
attempts to formulate the total amount of John as a partial function which assigns a point of reference
(i.e. the ordered pair of a possible world and a time point) to John at that point. But this is not a widely
accepted strategy. By an indiviudal, we understand an abstract object which is given by a single blow
and to which an epistemic subject commits itself; the individual John exists before his birth and after his
death in this sense. Dowty[7] calls the individual in Carlson's sense 'stage of individual' and the one in the
normal sense 'individual'.
The above individual John exists at least at a time point in the actual world. But we can assume those
individuals which don't exist in the actual world at all. E.g., in the following sentence
(24) If Nagoya had been more skillful in diplomacy, the Nagoya Olympic Gaines would have taken place
in the year 1988,
the Nagoya Olympic Games which don't actually exist, exist in other worlds. So, the existence of individuals
in (23) and (24) means that they have a physical appearance.
An example of (22Ia) is found in (5). I.e., if the speaker doesn't commit herself to the existence of
Pegasus, then it means that an entity in the model of the myth doesn't exist in her model.
Further, the denotation of a definite description such as 'the round square' doesn't exist in any model
at all.
Such kinds of existence represent a distance of existence. They would be distinguished as follows:
(25) a) John doesn't exist now,
b) The Nagoya Olympic Games do not actually exist,
c) Pegasus doesn't exist,
d) The round square cannot exist at all.4
In order to formulate (221), I adopt the following machinery:
(22Ia): Even if the speaker of (5) does not assume the existence of Pegasus, she can understand what
it is. And even if the speaker of (9) and (10) does not think that Cicero and Tully are different persons,
she understands that Tom believes that they are different.
Therefore, the speaker of the above sentences can understand - besides individuals in her own individual
domain - those individuals proper to the ontology of the myth or Tom. We call the former domain the
real individual domain, the latter the unreal individual domain. The speaker of the principal clause holds
the ontology of the speaker of the subordinate clause of a belief sentence and the myth. If we think of the
ontology of the speaker of the principal clause, the speaker of the subordinate clause, or the myth as a
model, we can say from the ontological viewpoint that the model of the speaker of the principal clause is a
supermodel of the speaker of the subordinate clause or the myth; conversely; the models of the latter are
submodels of the former.
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(22Ib): 'split up' and 'merge together' of individuals in (7), (8) and (9), (10) are treated by means of
counterpart relation between them. But the individual denoted with 'Cicero' and 'Tully' by the speaker
of the principal clause in (9), (10) and the two individuals denoted with them by Tom belong to different
kinds of ontology. So. the individuals in the couterpart relation - insofar as they aren't the same - are
interpreted to be different from each other.
5 Formal System
The above discussion is formalized as the following syntax and semantics of the language L.
5.1 Syntax of L
Vocabulary
i) a, b,c,... E C On St: set of individual constants.
ii) I, you,he,she,... E Ind: set of indexicals.
iii) x, y, z,. ; x l , .x 2 , .	 E	 a r: set of individual variables.
iv) pred-; EPredi (i,j > 0): set of j-ary predicates.
UiPredi = Fred: set of predicates.
Formation Rules The set of terms and the set of formulae in L are defined in the following simultaneous
inductive manner.
Set of Terms The minimal set Term which satisfies the following conditions is called the set of terms
of L.
i) If t E Const U hid U Var, then t E Ta?rm.
ii) If x E Var, and A E Form, then IxA E Term.
IT = {ixA I x E Var, and A E Form} is called the set of iota terms.
Set of Formulae The minimal set Form which satisfies the following conditions is called the set of
formulae of L.
i) predji (ti ,- • • ,ti ) E Form.
ii) If A. B E Form, then (--,A). (A A B), (A V B), (A B), (A B) E Form.
iii) If x E 'liar, A E Form, then (VxA), (BxA), (A xA), ( xA) E Form.
iv) If A E Form, (0.4), (0A) E Form.
v) If _4 E Form, Bel(a, A) E Form.
vi) If t, u E Term, G(t,u) E Form.
vii) If A E Form, (EA), (OA) E Form.
The set of vocabulary, terms, and formulae of L is called the set of expressions of L.
In	 the parentheses can be omitted in obvious cases. On the other hand, `[ ]' instead of
)' can be used in order to facilitate the understanding.
Proper names are expressed as individual constants in L.
Bella, p) is read: "a believes that p". G(t,u) represents the counterpart relation between t and a.
5.2 Semantics of L
5.2.1 Model Structure
MS = (D, MR)
is called a model structure.
i) D: individual domain.
D is divided into the domain of real individuals RD and the domain of unreal individuals UD.
ii) W: set of points of reference.
iii) R: reachability relation between possible worlds.
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TV is ordinarily interpreted as the set PW of possible worlds. But if necessary, we interpret it as the set
PW x T x P x ... of ordered pairs consisting of possible worlds, time points, places and so on.
5.2.2 Model
:ll =(MS, c, f)
is called a model of L.
i) MS: model structure in 5.2.1.
ii) c: context.
c- 4
 D
c(I) = cI, c(you) = ()you, c(he) = che, c(she) = cshe,... .
iii) f: value assignment to predicates and individual constants.
TT x Pred" --+ D"
Const D
5.2.3 Model Constellation
MC= ({Mi}iv,I1,F)
is called a model constellation of L.
i) Ali : a model.
The index set I is the minimal set which satisfies the following conditions:
i) E E I. (E represents the empty string. So, M, equals M.)
ii) If Mi =	 Wi,Ri),ci, fi ), d i E Di, wi E Wi , then iw i di E I.
ii) II determines Ciw i d i in Miwid , from w i E Wi , di E Di in Mi
 such that II(w i , di ) =
iii) r: a relation on RD i x	 F satisfies the transitivity.
If i, is E I (s is not empty), Mis is called a submodel of
	 Mi a supermodel of Mi.,. If s is i w id , Mis
is called a direct submodel of
	 Mi a direct supermodel of Mis . The individual domain of a supermodel
includes the individual domains of its direct submodel, i.e., Di D D itv,c1,-
5.2.4 Interpretation
Expressions of L are interpreted w.r.t. the interpretation function Mi (ci , w i .s i ,.) as follows.
The partial function s i : ar --+ D i is called the variable assignment of M. .s i D si.
i) If a E Const, Mi (ci , w i ,	 a) =	 a) E Di.
ii) If ind E Ind, Mi (ci ,w i ,s i ,ind) = ci (ind) E Di.
iii) If x E Var, Mi (ci , w i , s i , x) = si(x).
iv) If ixA E IT,
a) if for an unique d E Di , Mi (ci , w i , s i5,A) = 1, then Mi (ci ,wi ,s i ,IxA) = d,
b) otherwise undefined.
v) If predi E Predj ,	 = fi (wi ,predi ) E 2Dn.
Mi (ci ,wi ,si ,.) r Form: Form --+ {1, 0}.
(If and '0' mean true and false respectively.)
vi) Mi (ci , w i , s i „ predi (t i , • " , t i )) =	 wi, si, t1), • - Mi(ci,wi, si,ti).
vii)	 p A q,p V q,p D q,p q are interpreted in a normal manner.
viii) Mi (ci , wi, Si, VxA) =1 .4* for all d E RDi Mi (ci ,wi , s.4, A) = 1.
ix) Mi (ci , w i , s i , 2x A) =1 4#> for some d E RD i	= 1.
x) Mi (ci ,wi ,s i , A xA) = 1 4#.. for all d E Di Mi (ci ,	 = 1.
xi) ..41i (ci ,wi ,s i ,V xA) = 1 4* for some d E Di Mi (ci ,wi ,s4, A) = 1.
xii) Mi (ci , wi , s i , OA) = 1 4#. for all w E Wi Mi (ci ,w,sh .A) = 1.
xiii) Mi (ci ,wi ,s i , 0A) =1 q for some w E Wi Mi (ci , w, s i ,	 = 1.
xiv) Mi (ci ,wi ,s i ,Bel(a, A)) = 1 <#.	 wiwic,, siw i a, A) = 1.
(Mi (ci ,wi ,s i , a) = a.)
xv) Mi (ci ,wi ,s i ,G(t. u)) = 1 4=>	 wi,si,t)rMi(ci, wi,si,u).
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xvi) eA) = 1 <#. for an arbitrary is E I beginning with i A f is(cis. IV s is,	 = 1
xvii) Si. CA) =1 •#. for some is E I beginning with i Mis (e w s is , A) = 1
For form E Form, ..11i (ci ,wi ,s i , form) = 1, Mi (ci ,	 form) = 0 are also represented by Mi,
form, andf orm  respectively.
6 Solution of Problems
Now, we discuss some problems in the previous sections using the theoretical framework in 5.
(2)-(4) can be solved using the traditional modal logic.
There are several semantically equivalent methods to treat the existential problems in (5), (6) and (25).
The ordinary method is to use the existential quantifier, but in order to distinguish the meaning of
existence in (25), with restricted ranges of quantification. 5 E.g. (25c) is formulated as follows:
(25c') -,3x(a. = Pegasus).
In this case, the range of quantification is restricted to RD i , and there is no x which satisfies	 Pegasus,
so that (5') is true as a whole.
(25d) is formulated using V ranging over Di as follows:
(25&)	 x[A y[y = Pegasus	 = y]].
Likewise, (25a,b) with some appropriately restricted quantifies.
But here, I adopt a formulation close to surface syntactic expressions using existential predicates instead
of quantifiers: exist AN for (25a), exist A for (25b), exist for (25c), and designate for (25d) respectively.
Further, the definite description is represented by- t-term. Then (25a-d) are formulated as follows:
(25) a') --,exist AN (John),
b') OG),
c') -'exist(Pegasus),
d') -ndesign ate(tx Er oun d(x) A squar e(x)]).
Here, M	 s, exist .AN ) is the set of individuals which exists at the time point and the world of w.
Likewise. M (c, w, s, exist A ) is the set of individuals which exists in the world w, w, s, exist) is RD,
and Ai (c,w, 8, designate) is D respectively. According to this interpretation, the sentences in (25) are all
true.
For normal quantified sentences, I use '3' and 'V'. E.g.,
(26) Every Japanese is honest
is formulated as
(26') Vx(Japanese(x)
	 honest(x)).
In this case, the subject noun restricts the range of quantification.
(8)is formulated as
(8') V r,(G(Mary, x) A Bel(Bill, x = Anna)).
In this case, the quantification of V ranges over D. G(Mar y,x) singles out the counterpart in Bill's belief
of the `actual' Mary. And it is identified with the individual denoted by Bill with the proper name 'Anna'.
(9) and (10) are formulated as
(9') Bel(Tom, den ounce(Cicero, Catiline)),
(10') Bel(Tom --idenounce(Tully,Catiline))
respectively. As to the proper names `Cicero' and -Tully', they represent the de ditto reading, i.e., their
subordinate clauses directly express Tom's dictum.
But (9) and (10) can be arranged as follows:
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(9") Tom believes of Cicero that he denounced Catiline,
(10") Tom believes of Cicero that he didn't denounce Catiline.
They are formulated as
(9'") V x[G(Cicero, x) A Bel(Tom,denounce(x,Catiline))],
(101") V x[G(Cicero, x) A Bel(Tom,--denotince(x,Catiline))].
I.e., 'Cicero' in the ontology of the speaker of the principal clause corresponds to 'Cicero' and 'Tully' - two
different persons - in Tom's ontology, and the former denounced Catiline, but the latter not.
(17) is formulated as
(17') V x(G(B	 .
The necessity in (19) and (20) are expressed as follows:
(19') aAt(here)(now)(/),
(20') DAt(here)(now)(I).
Here, (19') is true, but (20') is false.
7 Existential Presupposition and Three-valued Logic
In (25), we saw the failure of existence. But it evokes some problems with the failure of existential
presupposition.
Suppose that John died last year. Then, how about the truth value of the following sentences?
(27) a) John is a student,
h) John is not a student.
The most plausible way seems to assign the truth value `neutral' to both sentences, because the existential
presupposition of John fails in them. But this interpretation cannot he done in the framework of the
two-valued semantics: If we interpret the negation in (27b) as the sentential negation, (27a) is false, and
(27b) is true. And even if we interpret it as the predicate negation which means
(28) John is a non-student,
both (27a) and (27b) are false. 6
 Then, in order to appropriately formulate the above-menioned intuition,
we must construct a three-valued semantics. And this is done in the present semantic framework as follows:
First, we consider that the predicate pred and its predicate negation pred satisfy the following conditions:
(29) a) Mi (ci ,w sh pred) (1
	 shpred) =
b)	 w sh pred) U	 shpred) C Di.
Then, consider the combination of truth values of the formula pred(a) and its negation. If the negation is
the sentential negation 	 then a) and d) in
(30) a) Mi,	 wi,	 pred(a),
	
coy	 --pred(a);
b)	 pred(a),
	
ch wi , s i	--pred(a);
c) t u	 pred(a),
--pred(a);
d)	 pred(a),
	
s i	 e d (a)
are not possible per definitionern. But if the negation is the predicate negation pred, then only a) in
r) A (11)(x = David)).
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(31) a)	 pred(a),
pred(a);
1))	 w	 pred(a),
pred(a);
c) si	 pred(a),
pred(a);
d) M	 w s	 pred(a),
w s i
	pred(a)
is not possible, and we can interpret d) as the case where the truth value 'neutral' is assigned to pr ed(a)
as well as pred(a). Formally. the truth value of this three-valued semantics is defined as follows:
(32) pred (pred(a)) and pred (pred(a)) are called conjugate of each other. Then
a) pred(a) (pred(a)) is true w.r.t.
	 wi, S i iff	 wi, s i , pred(a.)) = 1
(211i (ci , w i , s i , pred(a)) = 1).
b) pred(a) (pred(a)) is false w.r.t.
	 wi,	 iff its conjugate is true.
c) Otherwise, pred(a) (pred(a)) is neutral w.r.t.
	 wi, .si.
According to this definition, (27a,b) are interpreted as follows. First, they are formulated as
(27) a') student(John),
b') student (J ohn).
But here, the following conditions are assumed:
(33) a) Mi (ci , wi, si, student) U Mi (ci , wi , s i , student) = Mi (ci , wi , s i , exist AN),
b) Mi (ci , w i , s i , John)	 NI; (ci , w i ,s i , exist AN).
Then, both (27a) and (27b) are neutral.'
Apropos, we could also assume
(34) a) Mi (ci ,w i ,	 student) U	 student) C	 exist AN).
b) s John) E	 s exist AN),
c) John)	 student) U	 student)
in order for them to be neutral. This would represent the case where it's not certain if John is a student,
even if it's certain that John is alive. But it's different from the case in (27); the former occurs due to the
lack of information, whereas the latter is a genuine indefiniteness under complete information. I'm of the
opinion that the model like (34) should not be allowed, and the incomplete information should be treated
by means of Situation Semantics[3] or Data Semantics[23].
8 Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that, besides the normal modality, there is another kind of modality as it appears
in belief sentences, i.e. multi-modality. But it's difficult for the traditional method to treat the behavior of
individuals in the latter kind of modality. So, I proposed a new method based on multi-model, and argued
that it's effectively applicable to the multi-modal phenomena.
This paper is developed by means of traditional two-valued possible world semantics, and in fact, it's
enougth to treat the problem entitled "Individuals and Modality". But in this framework, the problems in
7 cannot be fully treated. There, only the three-valuedness of atomic sentences is treated in an implicite
form. We need to extend the three-valued interpretation to arbitrary sentences. Further, in order to treat
the problem with incomplete information pointed out there, and to set up a semantics which captures
the human cognitive state more naturally and elastically, we need to replace the possible world semantic
framework by the situation semantic one. This is the next very interesting theme.
Notes
1 Here, 'intensional' and 'modal' are used in the same meaning. And the context means here 'co-text' such
as 'it's possible ...' or 'He believes that ...'.
2 A formalization of such phenomena can be found e.g. in [15].
3 In this sense, the modal interpretation as a point language is a rigorous semantic framework excluding
pragmatic aspects, contrasting the normal situation semantic view including "many of the issues that.
would normally be classified as Pragmatics" [6, p.1]. But in the present framework, they are treated in a
multi-model semantic manner.
4 We can interpret that such individual terms represent metaphysical concepts which occupy an inter-
mediate stage between linguistic expressions and physical individuals. They are kind of pegs which are
introduced by proper names or definite descriptions. and to which various attributes are appended. But
they would lack physical appearance, be unreal, and not designate at all. In this regard, they resemble
discourse markers of DRT (Cf. [10, 111.)
5 This is a method which linguists are fond of. E.g., see [24].
6 As to Japanese, the particle 'nai' of negation is used for predicate negation only. And for sentential
negation, an artificial expression corresponding to 'ifs not the case that ...' must be used. (Cf. Sakai[21].
He also advocates the opinion that 'Ile denies the nuclear sentence (i.e. predicate) only.)
7 The following sentences
i) The round square is 10cm2,
ii) The round square is not 10cm2
can be formulated in two forms depending on the formulation of the definite noun phrase:
Using definite description:
x[A y[roun.d(y) A square(y) x = y] A 10cm2(x)],
in V x[A y[roun.d(y) A square(y) x = y) A 10cm2(x)],
Using i-operator:
i") 10cm2 (x)(t(round(y) A square(y))),
ii") 10c7n 2 (x)(t fround(y) A square(y))).
In the two-valued framework, they are all false. But in the three-valued framework, i') and ii') are false,
whereas i") and in are neutral. The former are false, because they commit themselves to the existance
of the round square by the reading -there is one and only one round square. and ...". In sum, i") and in
can grasp the semantic intuition about i) and ii) more appropriately than i') and ii'), which is a reason
why I prefer the formulation using i-opearator to definite description. (See also (27d').)
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